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THE DUAL POLICY

BY

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SINCE 15 March 1939 the British Government has been developing and pursuing what has come to be known as 'The Dual Policy'. It was described in outline by Lord Halifax on 29 June as a policy resting on twin foundations; first the resistance to force; then the constructive work of building peace.

In this pamphlet Sir Arthur Salter discusses the way in which this policy differs from the 'appeasement' policy which preceded it, the conditions of its success, and its possible development. In particular he advocates that the necessarily brief statement of Lord Halifax's proposals for a constructive peace plan should be worked out in much more detail and published in the form of a great State Paper. He also makes proposals as to the lines upon which such a State Paper might be framed.

Sir Arthur is for this purpose summarizing (and in certain passages repeating) a part of his book *Security: Can We Retrieve It?* (Macmillans, 8/6), which was published shortly before Lord Halifax's speech; and he and the Oxford University Press are indebted to the publishers for giving their permission for him to do so. It has, of course, only been possible in this pamphlet to summarize very briefly one part of the theme of this book, which in its 400 pages not only elaborates the proposals but places them in the setting of a comprehensive picture of the international position and our national problems.

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THE DUAL POLICY

The Ides of March 1939

ON 15 March 1939 the German Army proceeded to the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. That day may well prove in retrospect to have been the turning-point in the history of our time. For the uncertainties which had in many countries, and notably in Great Britain, made policy vacillating and divided public opinion, were now removed by a decisive act of which the significance was unmistakable. Czechoslovakia was now not merely truncated but destroyed; it ceased to exist as an independent State. The last remaining restraints imposed by the Munich Settlement were gone; and the pledges on which they depended were broken. The racial principle so strongly emphasized in all professions of the Nazi creed, while threatening aggression, had seemed to set some limits to its extent. The limits were now shown not to exist. Such hopes as remained in the British policy of 'appeasement', as it had been professed and practised for two years, were at once shattered. Throughout Europe the issue between the acceptance of domination by a combination controlled by Nazi Germany or resistance was now stark and clear, with no remaining haze of hopes or illusions to disguise it.

The effect upon British policy was quickly shown both in word and deed. Within a few days the Prime Minister had expressed his disillusionment and the consequent change in his

future course of action. The alliances with Poland and Turkey, the guarantees of Rumania and Greece, the opening of negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an alliance with Russia, followed in rapid succession. In the meantime the new orientation of British policy was described in a series of speeches of which the most explicit and comprehensive was that of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, on 29 June.

The essential features of this speech may be indicated by a few quotations.

'In the event of further aggression', he said, 'we are resolved to use at once the whole of our strength in fulfilment of our pledges to resist it. . . . Our first resolve is to stop aggression. At the moment the doctrine of force bars the way to settlement. But if the doctrine of force were once abandoned, all outstanding questions would be easier to solve. British policy rests on twin foundations of purpose. One is determination to resist force. The other is our recognition of the world's desire to get on with the constructive work of building peace. In a new atmosphere we could examine the colonial problems, the question of raw materials, the issue of *Lebensraum*, the limitations of armaments, and any other issue which affects the lives of all European citizens. Our next task would be the reconstruction of the international order on a broader and firmer foundation. That is too large a topic for me to embark on this evening, but I should like to commend it to your thinking.'

The present pamphlet is written in response to this invitation. *First* stop aggression; *then* a magnanimous general settlement. What are the antecedent causes, the essential conditions, the practicable developments of this 'Dual Policy' adumbrated by Lord Halifax?

Earlier British Policy

When hostilities ceased in November 1918 another major war was for the time made impossible by the overwhelming preponderance of strength in the hands of the Allies who had been successful. In the shelter of this temporary bulwark an attempt was made to set the peace of the world on a more permanent foundation by the establishment of a new political institution, the League of Nations. Under the Covenant the Member States, while otherwise retaining their sovereign independence, accepted certain limitations and obligations. They undertook not to resort to war until any cause of dispute had been investigated by other States or for a purpose of which those States disapproved. They undertook, moreover, to give collective help to a State which was attacked in violation of these provisions. In addition the Covenant contemplated changes in the *status quo* by a process of negotiation and agreement, and provided a mechanism through which States could co-operate in the solution of problems—whether economic and financial, social or humanitarian—of common interest and concern.

Since no single State could be strong enough to defy a combination of the rest, peace would, it was hoped, be assured, if the Member States were in general loyal to their engagements, with only an occasional exception. The purpose of national armaments was to be no longer the enforcement of national policy but the

defence, in combination, of international law and order. A defensive combination of this kind differed essentially from earlier alliances in that, instead of uniting certain specific countries with common national interests against others whose interests were expected to conflict with them, it was to bind all against the possible but unknown aggressor in their midst.

The hopes that this new political instrument, and the new conception of world government on which it was based, would assure the peace of the world waxed and waned, with many fluctuations of fortune, during the twenty years that followed the War. On the whole the prospects seemed to improve during the first decade, and then to worsen during the second —at first slowly but, from 1933 onwards, at an accelerating pace.

The causes of this, at least temporary, disappointment cannot now be discussed. We must consider the stage which had been reached when, after a diminishing reliance upon the League system, the British Government turned definitely, in 1937, under Mr. Chamberlain's lead, to the policy of 'appeasement'. By that time the authority of the League had been successfully challenged by Japan in its invasion of Manchuria, with little more than verbal protest. The Nazi régime had come into power in Germany; it had without resistance by Great Britain and France rearmed the country and reoccupied the demilitarized Rhineland. Italy had invaded Abyssinia, and Great Britain and France, with conflicting policies and divided

purpose, had led the League Members into a partial and limited resistance which proved ineffective, with two equally fatal results; the further loss of authority by the League and the transfer of Italy from the Anglo-French to the German orbit. Civil war had broken out in Spain where the Republican Government received some aid from Russia while the insurgents were assisted, upon what quickly became a much greater scale, by Italy and Germany. Events seemed to be leading to an early war in which Great Britain and France, with some though probably not all of their allies would be on one side, and Germany and Italy (probably aided by the simultaneous action of Japan) on the other. It was clear that the League of Nations, with the departure of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the continued abstention of the U.S.A., could not function as had originally been hoped; and, reduced to an alliance of countries opposed to aggression, it commanded no clear preponderance of collective strength. It seemed to Mr. Chamberlain that, in the circumstances, the use of the League as the main instrument of negotiation was undesirable; that the reconstitution of sufficient strength within the League system was impracticable; that the long score of broken engagements which the League had against the countries from which danger threatened was a handicap to the only kind of negotiations which offered any chance of success. He therefore decided upon direct negotiations with Germany and Italy, on the basis of passing a sponge over

the past, and attempted to find a settlement which, while giving some satisfaction to their ambitions, would set a limit to their aggression. Personal visits, direct communications, the establishment of the Non-Intervention Committee to isolate the Spanish struggle, were all directed to this purpose. This policy Mr. Chamberlain pursued for two years, in spite of successive disappointments, the determined opposition of his political opponents, and the occasional revolt of sections of his own supporters. The response of the dictator countries was, however, limited to occasional fair words, soon belied, and specious pledges, soon broken; it included no discernible change in the main course of their action. At the same time, if there was ever in the intentions of the British Prime Minister a comprehensive plan for a new general settlement, based upon clear principles to distinguish between what could be conceded and what must be resisted, no such plan was ever declared. As it expressed itself therefore in action, the 'appeasement' policy appeared, to potential foes and friends alike, no more than a readiness to yield under menace to successive demands, with an ultimate intention to resist only where British interests or French interests were directly assailed—with the diminished relative strength that would then be available for the purpose. The success of the policy rested upon the diminishing hope in the moderation and good faith of the dictators; and on the Ides of March of 1939 that hope perished.

The Dual Policy

The new policy which has since been announced, and is now being worked out, differs both from that of 'appeasement' and, for the time at least, from the earlier policy which was based upon the League of Nations.

The new policy differs from 'appeasement' in three respects. It offers immediate resistance to further aggression, and postpones concessions till a limit has been definitely set to forcible aggression. It attempts to increase the collective resources available for opposition to the Axis Powers by the acceptance of specific obligations to intervene in the event of an attack, not only upon France and Belgium, but upon countries in central and eastern Europe. It proposes at once to define and offer a constructive peace settlement on condition that aggression is abandoned.

A series of engagements of this kind is, however, very different from a League system even in miniature. It combines known friends against known enemies. It comprises a collective force which, if adequate to make aggressors hesitate, and perhaps to defeat them if they proceed, is not so overwhelming as to make aggression impossible or even a hopeless gamble. The engagements are moreover, in their first form, unequal and limited. Great Britain has given a guarantee to Greece and Rumania if they are attacked; but they have not in turn undertaken to fight if Great Britain is involved in war through aggression elsewhere.

Even where the engagements are reciprocal, they are not comprehensive. Poland, for example, is not bound to intervene if Great Britain is involved in war through an aggression in the Mediterranean, nor Turkey if the attack is on Poland—however probable their intervention may be in fact. Moreover, the scope of the treaties is limited to the resistance to aggression; they do not in themselves comprise such a system as the League provided for the settlement of disputes or co-operation in a wide range of positive tasks.

At the same time the new engagements, while differing in these respects from League principles, are not inconsistent with them; and they are based upon the first principle of the League, collective resistance to aggression, even though they do not extend to the other League principles. They are not, like the policy and engagements of the Axis Powers, available to assist aggressive action. Nor do they, like the ‘appeasement’ policy, permit, without intervention, aggression upon others. For this reason they at least offer a possible basis for rebuilding something like the League system of collective security—and incidentally make possible a much greater national unity than has in recent years been attainable.

National Unity

The differences in British public opinions as to our foreign policy have indeed been narrowed, in the last few months, till they have become largely questions of personality rather

than of principle. For many years nearly the whole of the Labour and Liberal Opposition in Parliament, with the corresponding sections of the public in the country, believed that the Government was, disastrously and unnecessarily, allowing the League system to be destroyed, and with it the best safeguard against our own national dangers; and during a part of this period substantial sections of those who are normally supporters of the Government sympathized with this opinion. For if, by 1937, the balance of strength had so changed as to prevent the League system from working as originally intended, the resources controlled by League Members, if properly used, had clearly been adequate in the preceding years. And even after 1937 the League system, though obviously so weakened that it could no longer afford a sure prospect of success, seemed to many to offer at least the best chance. Moreover, as the League became weaker through the departure of the Axis Powers, and their increasing strength, it acquired new sources of support—which at the same time changed its character—through the nature of the policies and ambitions of the Axis Powers. These Powers threatened Communism, and Russia became an active supporter of the League. They threatened the Left in general everywhere; and the Labour and Trade Union Movements brought a more fervent support to the system which promised resistance. They threatened liberty and freedom of thought and speech—and therefore

Liberals. They threatened the British Empire, and all Imperialists who were conscious of the gravity of the danger began to look to unaccustomed allies. Since, in threatening all these separate groups of interests, the Axis Powers were also employing the kind of aggression against which it was the first object of the League to provide protection, it was natural that the League should become the rallying point. On this basis the Left could unite with those Conservatives who disbelieved in appeasement; Communists with Democrats; Liberals with the dictatorship of Russia; Imperialists with Little Englanders. Lord Cecil would scarcely have imagined ten years ago that he would find himself ranged in support of the League with Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Lloyd George, and those who advocated an alliance with the Communist Dictator. But this was the position in 1938. Thus a powerful combination in Parliament and in the country offered a bitter and apparently irreconcilable opposition to Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement.

Since March of this year, however, Mr. Chamberlain has turned to the new policy here described, not indeed a League policy but one in conformity with its basic principle. Simultaneously, most of the supporters of the League have realized that, whatever the causes and the responsibility, the League system cannot now be at once used as it might have been a few years ago; and that, even if the goal of policy be the re-establishment of the League system,

the first step to it must be the policy described by Lord Halifax.

Under these conditions there is no longer a fundamental disunity in public opinion. All now, with the exception of a quite small minority, agree that aggression must be resisted and that this is the prior condition of any further satisfaction of grievances or ambitions.

This is not, however, to say that all important differences have ended. There is naturally considerable distrust of the ability and determination of those who have so long pursued an opposite policy to make the new one successful. Equally, critics who have so long vainly advocated the administrative and economic reforms required to maximize our defensive effort distrust the suitability of those who now admit the necessity of these reforms to carry them through successfully and quickly. Doubts of this kind, however, are very different from the deep divergence of policy and purpose which divided the nation till the spring of this year. There is now a prospect of a real national unity which will enable the country to attain its full strength for whatever trial it may have to endure. Whether that prospect is realized will depend upon the way in which the Dual Policy is developed; and it is that which we must now discuss.

Strength—National and Collective

The first purpose of the new policy being to stop aggression, its first necessity is to acquire sufficient strength to do so. This means, on

the one hand, extending and consolidating the alliances and reciprocal engagements which we are contracting, and, on the other, the increase of our own national forces. Little more need now be said of the first. The defects of the existing treaties and the directions in which we should attempt to straighten and develop them have been indicated.

The most important factor of uncertainty at the moment is the position of Russia. Ideological bias upon one or both sides may obstruct the conclusion of an alliance. But in the last resort the views of the negotiating countries as to their national interests are likely to determine the issue. Russia would have had a stronger inducement to join with us in assuring the defence of Poland last March than she now has after we have committed ourselves whether Russia participates or not. But Russia knows the limitations upon the power of France and ourselves alone to help Poland in a successful resistance to German invasion; and her interest in the maintenance of Poland between herself and Germany remains. Whether or not the alliance is concluded Germany will probably have to reckon with at least the probability that Russia would intervene if she seemed likely to subdue Poland to the status of vassal. But certainty as to Russia's attitude would obviously make a gamble much less attractive.

In our own defence preparations the pace and scale have greatly increased in recent months. The Air Force, in which our deficiency had been most serious, has been

immensely enlarged. The anti-aircraft defences have been developed, and arrangements made for the defence of civilians and for the evacuation of certain classes from the more dangerous areas. London is no longer undefended against air attack. The Navy, always stronger than any opposing fleet, has been further strengthened. The Army, though of course small by Continental standards, has been greatly increased by an expansion of the Territorials and is being fed with new recruits under the Military Training Act. Meanwhile industrial mobilization through a Ministry of Supply is now beginning, and reserves of food and raw materials are being, though too slowly, accumulated. In some instances these measures are still subject to limitations which should be removed; and executive action has been too long delayed, and is still too slow and on an inadequate scale. The progress since last autumn has, however, been considerable. An intending aggressor no longer has the prospect of a lightning success—if that was ever possible; and his chances in a long struggle are less and less encouraging. Nevertheless, there are important factors of uncertainty on our side, too. It is obvious that the utmost possible effort will be required both to enlist the aid of other countries, and to increase our own national strength, to ensure success in the event of war and still more to increase the deterrents against it. This is the first and indispensable condition of the success of the policy upon which we have now embarked. But it is not the only one.

A Constructive Peace

Physical strength, national or collective, is essential. But it is not enough. If we aim only at matching force against force; if we have no constructive policy to offer as an alternative to war, to work and if need be fight for, the future is indeed bleak and barren. If the peoples of the dictatorship countries, having no alternative which they consider tolerable, are firmly united behind their Government in policies of limitless aggression, we can scarcely hope for more than an equipoise of armed strength that will for a time give a precarious peace. And in the end such an armed peace of exhaustion is almost certain to be followed by a war of destruction, which would leave little of all we most value even after victory.

Nor shall we easily secure the inspiration necessary for our own efforts in a long trial, still less the sympathy and aid of countries exempt from any equally compelling necessity and menace, unless we have, beyond the first purpose of arresting or defeating aggression, a policy not merely of preserving but refashioning the world we know.

It is this which constitutes the importance of the second of Lord Halifax's 'twin foundations of the British purpose'. He has himself suggested some of the principles of such a constructive policy. He has so far done no more and has invited suggestions to help him in the task in which he is doubtless engaged, of elaborating his at present slightly sketched outline into a comprehensive plan.

The Conditions and Character of a General Settlement

We need, then, a peace policy which is boldly conceived and clearly stated. It should embody what we stand for in peace and, if need be, what we should fight for in war—and what we should be resolved to embody in any peace settlement so far as it is in our power to determine its terms. Our peace aims should be identical with our war aims, and with the principles of any peace treaty for which we may be responsible. We do not want again to lose a peace even if we win a war.

What should be the conditions and character of such a plan? It must aim at reaching and influencing the mind of the people of Germany; at enlisting the sympathy and aid of the countries less directly concerned; at affording for ourselves a basis of national unity and an inspiration for our own effort.

For all these purposes a mere willingness to make concessions when demanded is useless. To yield under menace, on one point after another, would be not magnanimity but weakness. It would discourage our own efforts, repel possible friends, earn not gratitude but contempt from our foes. It would infallibly whet the appetites of those who covet what we have, and not sate them. It would enforce the moral that the way to achieve results is to use or threaten force. Such a policy of surrender is in its nature limitless, or only limited at a point where purely national interests are directly involved, and those of the most material

kind. And when that point is reached, we should be disunited at home, stripped of friends, and impotent in the face of a demand for the ultimate surrender.

If therefore we publish the outline of a constructive peace settlement which includes, as it must include, an offer of important contributions at the expense of our own existing rights, it must of course be made clear, beyond any possibility of misunderstanding, that the prior condition is the cessation of aggression or the use of force and threats to obtain further advantages. It follows also that each part of any such comprehensive proposal must be dependent upon the rest, and upon the conclusion of a general settlement which must be accompanied by a cessation of the arms race and by a limitation of armaments.

If these are the conditions of any plan of settlement, its general character may be briefly defined before we discuss it more fully. It must appeal to the world as just and magnanimous. It must be calculated not only to alleviate an immediate crisis but to afford the foundation of a more enduring peace. It must aim at being, both in substance and method of presentation, acceptable to all that is, or may be, moderate in Germany.

The German Psychology

If we attempted to frame a peace settlement which would be at once tolerable to ourselves and compatible with either the policy or the professed creed of the Nazi régime, the task

might well seem a hopeless one. None who have watched the events of recent years, or who have read Mr. Ensor's *Mein Kampf* in this series, will have much doubt on that point. But we may too easily assume that the mind of Germany is the mind expressed in the action of the German Government, or that that Government can act without regard to what the German people think and feel. The Nazi rulers in fact find it necessary to maintain their authority by constant propaganda. The German people have responded because propaganda has been skilfully adjusted to the German psychology, and because no alternative has yet been clearly proclaimed which takes equal account of what they think and feel. Can we find a policy compatible with our own outlook and ideals which can at the same time touch what is as sensitive and responsive in the German mind as the fear of 'encirclement' and the desire for *Lebensraum* to which Herr Goebbels appeals?

Let us recall for our encouragement that the German people is not yet a people conditioned from childhood. They have been subjected to the influence of the Nazi régime for six years, but no more. Adult Germans passed through the formative period of their lives in a different environment and under the influence of different ideals. In a generation, if the régime endures, there may be a German people conditioned from childhood whose mind may be impenetrable by other influences. But surely there is still something in the mind of the

people, even though hidden for the moment, to which the appeal of a different philosophy can reach? The Germans are a people who a century ago nearly established a great liberal State, and would probably have done so a decade and a half ago had Allied policy been more magnanimous and more helpful. And even within the last year there have been encouraging signs. From time to time they have shown themselves sceptical of Nazi propaganda, anxious to avoid war, not insensitive to the attitude of other countries to the Nazi persecutions. And while each new triumph of Nazi diplomacy has evoked some natural elation, and won new prestige for the régime, the effect has often been curiously short-lived in relation to the cause, and seems less and less lasting upon each successive occasion. As when a patient is stimulated by drugs, stronger and more frequent doses seem necessary to secure the result. Since the spring the appeal to fears of 'encirclement' has had a great success in uniting even the more moderate Germans behind the Nazi policy, but that appeal too may lose its force, if we can find the appropriate answer to it.

In any case, however, the task of penetrating the German mind is one of great difficulty and delicacy. We need to consider carefully the German psychology before we frame any proposals or choose the method of presentation.

The most dangerous of all states of national psychology is that which develops at a time of transition from inferiority to equal or superior

strength. Germany, Italy, and Japan have all passed recently through periods in which they were treated as inferior by those with whom they felt they should be equals, and in which, while bitterly resenting this treatment, they had to endure it because of their weakness. Under the impulse of this resentment they have since acquired a power which makes them more feared than they fear others. The psychological state which attends this process is inaccurately described as either an inferiority or a superiority complex. It is much more dangerous than either. It combines the worst of both. It combines the resentment of weakness with the arrogance of strength. Success may intoxicate like wine, but a potion composed of memories of humiliation and a new consciousness of power may madden like a noxious drug.

With this underlying psychology in mind we must turn to the specific causes which tend to rally even the more moderate and liberal Germans behind a régime whose policy is in many respects repugnant to them.

In the first place they feel that Herr Hitler has restored Germany to a position of power, in which the humiliations which they like all Germans bitterly resented, and the remaining grievances of the 'unequal' Treaty, can be removed. The Treaty of Versailles (and the policy of execution in the early post-War years) was the child of two parents: the Fourteen Points of Wilson, proclaimed before the military issue had been decided, and the decisive victory and surrender of November

1918. There was in the settlement much of impartial justice and idealism; but much too of the terms of a victor imposed on the vanquished. Much of the latter has since been reversed; but something remains.

It is indeed no matter of surprise that the Treaty should not have been an embodiment of ideal and equal justice. Justice is a child of peace and not of conflict; and a just settlement will not, save by a rare accident, be wrested from an armed struggle. The sword once drawn will be thrown weightily into the scales. It is essential that we should remember that whatever there is of this kind in the Treaty settlement reflected an overwhelming military superiority; and that such a military superiority no longer exists. We must now be prepared for the substitution of a negotiated for an imposed settlement, and for the kind of changes which must be expected to follow from this difference.

More specifically, we must reckon with the desire for *Lebensraum*, with a kind of claustrophobia and sense of economic suffocation which Germany associates (even though to a large extent mistakenly) with the loss of her colonies.

In the third place, we must consider how deep in the psychology of Germany is the fear of 'encirclement'. Ever since Bismarck's less skilful successors forgot Russia this fear has been for the German people what the fear of interference with sea communications has been for the British. It is difficult for us in face of the successive aggressions of Germany and the consciousness of our own anxieties and pre-

occupations, to realize that this fear is still a real and genuine one. To us the French invasion of the Ruhr is a distant memory: but to the German people it is still a recent and vivid one.

Lastly, we need to take into account what there is of constructive purpose in the mind of Germany. The German State system of economic control and regulation is regarded by us as a powerful instrument of military preparation. It is indeed that; but it is not only that. It is to the German people also a system which, if turned from armaments to works of public welfare, might promise benefits to the bulk of the people which the earlier form of private capitalism would never give. They may be right or wrong, but it is useless merely to preach a return to a free economy of unrestricted competition and private enterprise. So too with the political régime of Europe. We are concerned to protect the independence of European States, small as well as large. That must at least be the first step; but surely it is not the last. Must we not look forward to the creation of a 'United States of Europe', a framework within which the economy of Europe would be enlarged and major political questions resolved through a wider political system? In the construction of such a new system a Germany which had once turned from its present policy of forcible aggression would properly play a great role; and the prospect of co-operating in such a task might appeal to all that is best in the country.

The Substance of a General Settlement

Limits of space forbid more than the most tentative suggestions as to the actual substance of any settlement which we should propose. I must for the most part be content to pose the questions rather than give the answers.

We should, I suggest, in the first place recognize frankly the truth about the Versailles Treaty and offer to substitute a negotiated for the imposed settlement; based on an equality, not an inequality, of strength, but as a minor preliminary we might offer to cancel the clause which implies war guilt. No clause was more useful to those who were hostile to the Weimar Republic and to the policy of 'fulfilment' as a basis for exploiting popular discontent and resistance. The reason is to be found neither in the exasperation of a bad conscience reminded of guilt, nor in indignation at the idea that Germany could ever be in favour of resorting to war (which the Nazi Party could scarcely represent as shameful). The explanation is that the clause is obviously one that could only have been accepted by any country under *force majeure*; and that it is obviously repugnant to a sense of justice that such a verdict should be pronounced by a court of political enemies who had been at war with the defendant for four years. For these reasons the clause should be cancelled—without prejudice to the question of war responsibility, which should be left to posterity and the historian—as unsuitable for inclusion in a Peace Treaty.

Encirclement

We should, I suggest, emphasize much more clearly and unmistakably than we have done at present the *defensive* or *negative* side of our treaties and engagements. For example, we have promised to fight on the side of France in case of 'unprovoked aggression'. This of course implies no obligation upon us in the extremely unlikely, and we may well believe impossible, event of her being invaded in consequence either of her initial aggression upon Germany or her support of an ally which had not suffered but—in substance as well as form—initiated aggressive action. It would, of course, be fatal to make any statement at a time, or in a form, which could suggest any weakening of our tie with France and obviously it would need to be in agreement with her and with her cordial assent. Subject to this condition a very definite statement of what our defensive engagements do not mean, as well as what they do mean, might well be valuable in a general statement. Could we, and our Allies, not go even a little farther and directly propose a Treaty to Germany under which we and she would 'remain neutral in a war forced on the other by aggression from whatever quarter'?

Lebensraum and Economic Opportunity

Lebensraum, or a place in the sun, is the historic claim and ambition of Germany, as 'encirclement' is her historic anxiety. If it is

interpreted as a right of access to the resources* and markets of other countries and of opportunities to find outside the frontiers of Germany herself the supplementary resources she needs, it is a natural, legitimate, and realizable ambition. If it means the forcible dispossession of others, the domination and subjection of sovereign States, it necessarily encounters the combined resistance of those who fear such aggression and of those who are pledged to help them. If Germany hopes to replace the deficiency of internal resources by colonial possessions, the ambition is equally impracticable, apart from any difficulties of transfer. All Germany's colonies accounted in 1913 for only about one-half per cent. of her external trade, and though this proportion might be increased, it could not exceed a modest fraction of her need. All industrialized countries (our own included) find the main supplement to the resources within their own frontiers not from external possessions, but from foreign trade. Then there is the question of migration. Lord Halifax pointed out that Germany is now so far from suffering from a congestion of population that she is experiencing a shortage of labour and is attracting immigrants from foreign countries. That in itself might not seem a convincing argument to a German, for he would say that this is due to the special conditions of intensive armaments. But even in 1913, when migration was free and economic conditions normal, it is significant that there

*See Pamphlet No. 7. *Colonies and Raw Materials* by Mr. H. D. Henderson.

were as many immigrants into Germany as emigrants out. It is even more significant that all but the minutest fraction of emigrants went not to her colonies but to North and South America. The post-War barriers to migration have been a principal cause of tension in Europe.

Arguments of this kind are of course useless unless they are accompanied by positive proposals. There is much that we and other countries could do which I can only mention without discussion. We could help a Germany which had turned from war to peace to obtain raw materials, not merely by supplying them as we do at equal prices, which is not enough for a country with Germany's currency system, but by a form of barter arrangement compatible both with her system and our own. We could open our colonial markets and help to open or expand markets elsewhere. There are areas in the world where joint enterprises of development would be practicable. And our Dominions and other countries with opportunities of industrial expansion could permit and encourage migration.

Colonies

The colonial problem is perhaps the most difficult part of any constructive plan we propose. I can only now recall some of the main factors in it and suggest a few conclusions.

We, France and others, hold, though under mandate, all the colonies which Germany had possessed and administrated for a quarter of a century before the War. But the fifth of

Wilson's Fourteen Points had provided for 'A free, open-handed and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is determined.' The German people as a whole, and not merely the Nazi Government, have always felt bitterly that the first part of this pledge was broken. The more moderate sections of the German public have at the same time recognized that the second part, which has led to the imperfect but nevertheless promising Mandate system, is of equal validity. There would be every reason for the re-transfer of the colonies to German administration, were the German Government pacific and humane. But to transfer the inhabitants to rulers who have selected for special honour, not the best, but the worst, of German colonial governors, and whose attitude to what Germany regards as inferior races has been shown in relation to both the Jews and the Czechs, would be an act not of statesmanship but of cowardice. And, equally, to transfer places of strategic importance under conditions which would make them not a part of a real peace settlement but a new vantage ground in another and immediate war, would be not magnanimity but mere folly. If the colonies could be transferred under an adequate Mandate, and under conditions which would secure the observance of the Mandate, the

position would be very different. Even then, however, it cannot be expected that the most moderate opinion in Germany would ever willingly accept a principle of international responsibility for one category only of non-self-governing colonies, those which were once in German sovereignty.

At this point the question becomes enlarged to one of colonial policy in general. And as the greatest of colonial Powers, we need to face it as a whole having regard to our changed relative strength in the world and the attitude of other countries, and a large section of our own public, to all that is implied by 'imperialism'.

We acquired our overseas territories as a sequel to adventurous trading enterprise, as incidents of our sea-power, as the natural consequences of wars in which we had taken a successful part, as new supporting outposts for territory already in our charge, with a mixture of statecraft and absence of mind. The motive was sometimes commercial, sometimes strategic, sometimes a jealousy of rivals, sometimes a subconscious instinct towards what in others we call a desire for imperial prestige; it was not philanthropic. And we have derived advantages, both economic and strategic—less than covetous envy may estimate, but still substantial, from their possession. That is the aspect which our imperialism presents to the eyes of others.

It is, however, equally true that what was acquired as a prize has been to an equal extent administered as a trust. We have developed

a colonial creed which was from an early stage one of paternal administration and soon developed into one which genuinely aims at its replacement by self-government. The Dominions have already become self-governing States. India is far advanced upon the same path. Many colonies have reached differing stages of partial self-government, and the same ultimate goal is aimed at for the rest. Moreover, until the recent decision to close the 'open door' (a decision which Lord Halifax has suggested, might, under suitable conditions, be reversed) we administered the colonies on a basic principle which was in the interest not only of the inhabitants but of the world as a whole.

These two aspects of our colonial problem have equal validity. It is not hypocrisy, but plain sense, to say that the abandonment of peoples who, as the Covenant says, are 'not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world' to whatever form of government they could devise for themselves, or to any rival imperial Power which would treat them as exploitable possessions, would be against the interests both of the inhabitants and of the world as a whole.

In my view the colonies of the world have become a world problem, and we should be prepared to recognize a responsibility to the rest of the world for our administration of what is under our rule.

It is the acid test of those who criticize our 'imperialism' on the usual grounds that they should be prepared to join in constructing,

and submitting to, a political instrument which would give adequate expression to this world responsibility. It is an acid test of our own sincerity in arguing that we administer our colonies as a trust that we should equally accept such a sharing of responsibility.

What form of world administration, or enlarged and extended Mandate authority, may ultimately develop cannot now be discussed. There are various possible alternatives; and a condominium with a different Germany over some colonies should not be excluded. I would suggest, however, that we should assent to the main principle and offer immediately to extend the Mandate system to the non-self-governing British colonies, beginning with those in tropical Africa.

A British State Paper

I have discussed British policy and British contributions because that is the subject on which we ourselves need to think and work at once.

Many suggest a World Conference. That indeed may be desirable at some stage—but it is a late stage, not an early one. Little comes out of a great conference at the end that has not been put into it at the beginning. The first work and the main work is that of national preparation and then specialized and informed international negotiation. In the first instance we should in my view work out what we are prepared to contribute to a world settlement—and announce it. For this purpose a speech, or a series of speeches, will not be enough.

ciples. And to penetrate the mind of Germany, or to appeal to the world, we need something much more definite and concrete. I suggest therefore that we should state what is implied by the second part of Lord Halifax's 'Dual Policy' with the ample scope and concrete detail that is only possible in a great State Paper. The moment and method of its presentation will need careful calculation. The immediate task is to prepare it. This is not just a question of drafting. Vital decisions will be required, and consultations with our Allies. There is not a moment to lose. The task is difficult. But the possible reward is incalculable.

A broadly conceived and magnanimous, constructive peace policy, presented as a White Paper, circulated simultaneously to every Government, amplified and explained by a series of speeches, transmitted to the listening public of all countries by radio and every other form of communication, might transform the whole international situation. It might penetrate the will to aggression of the people of Germany. It would enlist the sympathy and aid of other countries. It would be an inspiration to our own efforts. It might even now avert a war; if not, it might shorten it and help to ensure success. And not the least of its advantages is that it should not be averted, might serve as a bulwark against the conflict which brings, and chances of a more tolerable



